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Abstract 
The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been 
the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often 
flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to the selfish goal of survival 
inherent in Darwinian evolution. In order to resolve this paradox, evolutionary game 
theory has focused on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), which incorporates the essence of 
this conflict. 
Here, we encode strategies for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) in terms of 
conditional probabilities that represent the response of decision pathways given 
previous plays.  We find that if these stochastic strategies are encoded as genes that 
undergo Darwinian evolution, the environmental conditions that the strategies are 
adapting to determine the fixed point of the evolutionary trajectory, which could be 
either cooperation or defection. A transition between cooperative and defective 
attractors occurs as a function of different parameters such a mutation rate, replacement 
rate, and memory, all of which affect a player’s ability to predict an opponent’s 
behavior. 
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These results imply that in populations of players that can use previous decisions to plan 
future ones, cooperation depends critically on whether the players can rely on facing the 
same strategies that they have adapted to. Defection, on the other hand, is the optimal 
adaptive response in environments that change so quickly that the information gathered 
from previous plays cannot usefully be integrated for a response. 
Author Summary 
The observed cooperation between genes, cells, tissues, and higher organisms represents 
a paradox for Darwinian evolution, because the individual success of cheating is 
rewarded before its long-term detrimental consequences are felt.  The tension between 
cooperation and defection can be represented by a simple game (the “Prisoner’s 
Dilemma”), which has been used to study the conflicts between decisions to cooperate 
or defect. Here, we encode these decisions within genes, and allow them to adapt to 
environments that differ in how well a player can predict how an opponent is going to 
play. We find that evolutionary paths end at strategies that cooperate if the environment 
is sufficiently predictable, while they end in defection in uncertain and inconsistent 
worlds because inconsistency favors defection over cooperation. This work shows that 
cooperation or defection, in populations of players that use the information from 
previous moves to plan future ones, can be influenced by changing the environmental 
parameters. 
Introduction 
The evolution of cooperation is difficult to understand within Darwinian theory 
[1-3]. Indeed, cooperation is intrinsically vulnerable to exploitation because evolution 
rewards individual success, while any detrimental long-term effects for the group are 
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secondary [4,5]. The tension between the short-term benefits of defection and the long-
term benefits of cooperation has been studied using the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a 
paradigm of social conflicts [3,6-9]. Previous work has shown that cooperation can only 
emerge in the presence of different enabling mechanisms. The main ones are direct 
reciprocity [6,10] (which can emerge when players play against each other repeatedly), 
spatial reciprocity [7], which is ensured if players only play neighbors on a regular grid 
(or more generally, on arbitrary graphs, giving rise to “network reciprocity” [11]), tag-
based selection [12] (where players can recognize each other using some observable 
trait),  kin selection [13], indirect reciprocity [14,15] (where cooperative or altruistic 
acts increase a player’s reputation), or group selection [16]. Social diversity, where 
either the payoffs or the neighborhoods vary from player to player [17,18] can also 
enhance cooperation, as can “active linking” [19,20], where players differ in the rate at 
which they maintain interactions with other players. Generally speaking, the co-
evolution of strategies with the different enabling mechanisms can also increase 
cooperation [21]. In all the discussed scenarios, a player’s strategy is such that they 
either cooperate or defect in a deterministic manner, sometimes conditionally on 
previous plays.  
If a cooperating strategy accidentally defects (or a defector accidentally 
cooperates) the noise that is introduced in this manner can have a dramatic effect on the 
competition. For example, among the (deterministic) strategies that take one previous 
move into account in order to decide how to play, the reciprocating strategy “TFT” (Tit-
for-Tat) dominates [6], but is outcompeted [22-24] by  “Win-Stay-Lose-Shift” (WSLS), 
which can correct for occasional mistakes [23]. Experiments with bacteria [25] and 
social amoeba [26] indeed suggest that the decision to cooperate or defect (in a general 
sense) is stochastic, and moreover that these decisions are controlled by genetically-
encoded probabilities that are evolvable [27]. Rather than assuming that noisy decisions 
are either due to fuzziness in perception or lack of control over one’s action [22], here 
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we allow these probabilities to be fine-tuned by adaptation in response to the 
environment. We find that if a player’s stochastic decisions are under genetic control, 
then the level of uncertainty about an opponent’s next move (given their previous 
encounter) determines whether cooperation or defection evolves. Because this 
uncertainty is a direct consequence of environmental conditions, we conclude that when 
decisions are based on previous interactions, these conditions alone are sufficient to 
explain the evolution of cooperation in populations. Note that the stochasticity 
introduced by probabilistic play controlled by genes is fundamentally different from 
other random effects that can be introduced into evolutionary game dynamics, such as a 
probability to inherit a neighbor’s strategy [28], or stochastically fluctuating payoffs 
[29,30], because neither of them can evolve.  
In its simplest form, PD players have only two play options: cooperate (C) or 
defect (D). Both players are awarded a payoff R for mutual cooperation and a payoff P 
for mutual defection. Unequal moves award S to the cooperator and T to the defector. In 
standard PD [6], the values of the payoffs are constrained so that T > R > P > S and R > 
(S+T)/2. The first equation ensures that for a single round of play, defection is an 
evolutionary stable strategy [4], while the second equation ensures that reciprocation of 
cooperation is favored over the trading of cooperative with defective moves. In the 
repeated PD (iterated PD or IPD) that we study here, two players meet more than once, 
and can establish cooperation by means of direct reciprocity [6]. In particular, we study 
exclusively the IPD with memory, that is, where players base their decision on previous 
plays (except for the first move with a new opponent). The term “memory” is not meant 
to imply that only higher organisms can engage in such strategies. Rather, stochastic 
decisions can be based entirely on the levels of protein on a cell’s receptor, for example, 
and where these protein levels are the result of a cellular “decision” at an earlier time. A 
simple example for such a stochastic decision in response to the decision of other cells 
is quorum sensing in bacteria (see, e.g., [31]). We contend that the introduction of 
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information exchange between players (via conditional strategies) is crucial for the 
evolution of cooperation.  
Results 
We evolve strategies in spatially-structured and well-mixed finite populations, as 
it is known that the evolutionary dynamics depend on population structure as well as 
size (small fitness differences are effectively neutral only in finite populations [32]). 
Evolution experiments are carried out with populations on a regular 32x32 grid with 
wrapping boundary conditions, where the manner of replacement determines the 
population structure. Players engage their eight closest neighbors exactly once every 
update (playing one move), for 500,000 iterations. At the end of each update, a 
proportion r (the replacement rate) of players is randomly eliminated using a Moran-like 
process [33,34], establishing a finite probability of future encounters between players 
beyond the first [35]. For spatially-structured populations, each player marked for death 
is replaced by an offspring of one of his neighbors, while for well-mixed populations 
the entire grid of players is considered for filling the empty position. In both population 
types, replicating players are chosen in proportion to their fitness, defined as the 
accumulated score. Scores are awarded according to the standard payoff matrix of 
Axelrod [35] throughout, with T=5, R=3, P=1, S=0.  
For memory-one strategies, each player is represented by a genotype (strategy) 
composed of five genes, four of which encode the conditional probabilities PXY 
representing the probability that a player will cooperate, given that his last historical 
play was X and his opponent’s response was Y, along with the unconditional 
probability PC to cooperate on the first move [24]. Each population is seeded with the 
“random” genotype where each of the five probabilities is set to 0.5. At each replication 
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event, genes are subject to a per-gene mutation rate µ, replacing that gene’s probability 
to cooperate with a uniformly distributed number between 0 and 1.  
For each evolutionary run, we record the genotype as well as phenotype (play 
statistics πCC, πCD, πDC, and πDD, given by the fraction of that type of play among all 
plays) for each organism on the line of descent (LOD) [36]. The LOD is generated by 
randomly selecting a genotype at the end of each run and tracing back its ancestry to the 
seeding genotype.  Compared to the previously discovered deterministic memory-one 
strategies [37], our genetic implementation leads to the evolution of novel and 
drastically different successful strategies, depending on mutation rate, replacement rate, 
and population structure. None of the 32 deterministic strategies ever appear on the 
LOD, but instead, strategies evolve that are either cooperative or defective, depending 
on the experimental setting. Using the LOD averaged over 80 runs (see Fig. S1), we can 
obtain a consensus genotype for the particular experiment by averaging all genotypes in 
the latter half of this average LOD, removing any influence from the starting conditions 
(see Methods).  
The consensus genotype for spatially-structured populations at low mutation and 
replacement rates is that of a cooperative strategy (PC, PCC, PCD, PDC, PDD=0.647, 0.989, 
0.234, 0.318, 0.448), as is evident from a commitment to exchange C plays (i.e., PCC ≈ 
1) and a tendency to cooperate on the first move. By having a low PCD probability this 
strategy maintains a low tolerance to opponent defection and displays an unwillingness 
to be exploited. Maintaining a PDD value close to 0.5 with a slight bias towards 
defection, the consensus genotype expresses indifference in propagating defection but 
willingness to return to cooperation, a behavior not previously seen among stochastic 
strategies [24]. When faced with defective play, the strategy will acquire a deficit in 
lifetime payoff, which can be offset by exploiting naïve cooperators (and occasionally 
similar strategies) as indicated by a low PDC probability. Consensus strategies for 
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cooperation in well-mixed populations, as well as defectors in both population 
structures (that appear at high mutation and replacement rates) are listed in Table S1 and 
described in Text S1. 
In order to monitor the evolution of strategies, we reduce strategy space by 
performing a principal component analysis (PCA) of the probabilities on the average 
LOD obtained from 80 runs at mutation rate µ=0.5% and replacement rate r=1%, and 
use these components to display the average trajectory at other mutation rates as well. 
For the spatially-structured population the first two principal components explain 83% 
and 10% of the variance, respectively (see Methods). Within the two-dimensional 
window defined by these principal components, we can also mark the location of some 
well-known strategies (see Fig. 1). We find that evolutionary trajectories obtained from 
the average LOD move towards a fixed point defined by a consensus genotype (see 
Methods) that represents the dominant strategy in the particular regime, while the actual 
genotypes on the LOD form a cloud in strategy space around the consensus that defines 
the strategy attractor. Strategies form clouds around this attractor because in a genetic 
implementation of IPD, the selective pressures acting on genes depend on the 
population a player finds himself in. For example, the DD gene in a cooperating 
population will begin to drift, only to return to its adaptive value when an invasion of 
defectors reinstates the selective pressure. Similarly, the CD and DC genes are under 
weakened selection in spatial populations because they are only expressed at the 
boundaries of homogeneous clusters. 
The path in strategy space along the average LOD depends strongly on the 
mutation rate, and shows a qualitative switch—reminiscent of a phase transition—from 
the cooperative attractor RC (Fig. 1A) to the defecting attractor RD (Fig. 1C) at a 
critical value (Fig. 1B), as the mutation rate is increased. Studying the trajectories that 
emanate from the 16 (ignoring the first gene) deterministic strategies (Fig. 1D) suggests 
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that the evolutionary fixed points are unique attractors for a given environment. We 
characterize the attractors with an order parameter m generated from the average play 
frequencies: 
                                          
  
m = πCC − πDD
πCC + πDD
,           [1] 
which is the normalized difference between frequencies of cooperative and defective 
play, averaged over the genotypes on the LOD after equilibration (see Methods).  This 
parameter crosses zero at a critical mutation rate (Fig. 2A), indicating a transition from 
cooperative to defective strategies. We find that a transition can also be forced by 
changing the replacement rate r, as well as other parameters discussed below.  
We can study the evolution of cooperation by plotting the order parameter Eq. [1] 
as a function of r and µ in a phase diagram that shows that both low replacement rate 
and low mutation rate lead to cooperation (Fig. 2B), but that the cooperative phase is 
much smaller for well-mixed populations (Fig. 2C). As µ approaches 0.5 (a per-genome 
mutation rate of 2.5 mutations per replication event), both the spatially-structured and 
the well-mixed populations begin to drift randomly, signaling that selection has become 
incapable of maintaining the genetic information. This transition is likely a quasispecies 
delocalization [38], but is smooth rather than abrupt owing to the small genome size 
[39]. That all strategies occur with equal frequencies in the population when taking the 
limit of very high mutation rate has been noted before [40].  
Previous studies have only investigated small slices of this phase diagram by 
varying the average number of rounds between players [6] (for deterministic strategies) 
or varying the mutation rate in analytic calculations and numeric simulations of an 
infinitely iterated Markov process [11,40], concluding that cooperation is favored in 
spatially-structured population but not in well-mixed ones [41]. The phase diagram 
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suggests instead that both cooperation and defection are possible in either population 
structure, but that the parameter range that facilitates cooperation in well-mixed 
populations is more restricted.  
As the order parameter Eq. [1] is obtained from play statistics that represent the 
phenotype of players, we may ask how this transition is reflected in the genotype 
instead. The consensus genotype shows a marked decrease of the PCC probability as 
mutation rate increases, with clear differences between strategies in spatial (Fig. 3A) 
versus well-mixed (Fig. 3B) scenarios, as has been noted before [24]. At the critical 
mutation rate (Fig. 3, dashed vertical lines), the probability to cooperate after CC equals 
the probability to defect after DD. Thus, the consensus genotypes mirror the play 
statistics obtained to define the critical point.  
Discussion 
Cooperation is inherently more risky than defection because it forgoes a 
guaranteed return (P) with the expectation of a benefit (R), rather than keeping the 
guaranteed return hoping for a windfall (T). This risk is mitigated if the uncertainty 
about receiving the benefit is reduced. For example, spatial reciprocity allows kin 
strategies to preferentially play each other (because kin place offspring close to 
themselves) thus increasing trust. In our model, an increase in mutation rate decreases 
the probability that kin play the same strategy (because mutations change the strategy of 
kin), and thus increases the uncertainty about the identity of the strategy a player will 
face. An increased replacement rate has a similar effect, as increasing r shortens the 
average number of plays that a pair engages in, and this again decreases the probability 
to face a kin strategy (mutated or not). Previously, a general theory for the evolution of 
cooperation has been proposed [42,43] that posits that positive assortment between a 
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player’s genotype and the opponent’s phenotype is sufficient to promote cooperation, 
using arguments that ultimately recapitulate Queller’s [44] extension of Hamilton’s rule.  
In our experiments with stochastic conditional strategies, the assortment between 
a player’s genotype and an opponent’s phenotype is generated via the evolution of 
conditional interactions between the players [45], i.e., their ability to base their 
decisions on information about past behavior. In a sense, evolutionary adaptation 
creates this assortment by forging a “model” of the environment (in terms of the 
probabilities PXY) that is adapted to the phenotype given by the play frequencies πXY. For 
example, the cooperative fixed point represents a strategy that cooperates with 
cooperators, retaliates against defectors, but also forgives mistakes. Thus, it models an 
environment where cooperators dominate, errors happen, and sometimes defectors try to 
invade.  
More uncertain environments reduce the accuracy of the model, thereby reducing 
positive assortment, leading to reduced cooperation. Can changing environmental 
conditions then drive a population from a cooperating to a defecting phenotype and vice 
versa? In Fig. 4, we show the order parameter of an adapting population on the line of 
descent where we changed the mutation rate abruptly from one favoring defection to 
one favoring cooperation, and back. We see that the population responds quickly (in 
terms of evolutionary time) and predictably to the changes. 
If consistent environments enable cooperative behavior of strategies that rely on 
“sensing” their environment, we should also be able to influence the critical mutation 
rate (where cooperation turns into defection) by changing other parameters that affect 
uncertainty. For example, it is possible to increase player memory so that the last two 
moves by both players are taken into account to make decisions about cooperation or 
defection. In this case, player strategies are encoded in 21 genes, which can be used to 
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predict future moves. As expected, the critical mutation rate is pushed to higher 
genomic mutation rates µL (where L is the number of genes) for memory 2 (Fig. 5A), 
and even higher for memory 3 (data not shown). Another source of unpredictability is 
the maximal strategy uncertainty given by the Shannon entropy [46] of the genome. In 
the present implementation, the probabilities that affect player decisions are coarse-
grained to a resolution of 32,768 different alleles for each probability, or 15 bits of 
entropy per gene. Decreasing this resolution decreases the uncertainty generated by 
mutations. Fig. 5B shows the dependence of the order parameter on mutation rate for 
coarse-grainings of strategy space down to 1 bit (the deterministic strategies). In this 
limit, the critical mutation rate (for 1% replacement) is pushed towards µ=10%, 
implying that higher mutation rates result in defective play even though cooperation is 
expected [7,47]. Thus, obtaining more information about the environment, for example 
by basing decisions on more than one past move, increases the amount of information 
that a player can use to model the environment, and therefore gives rise to a more close 
assortment between genotype and opponent phenotype, which increases cooperation.  
A framework where evolutionary game theory is implemented via genes that are 
under mutation and selection could also be used to predict how manipulation of the 
environment will affect the evolutionary fixed point in other systems. For example, 
defection has been observed in a number of biological systems whose dynamics can be 
described by a PD payoff matrix [48,49]. It is tempting to imagine that these systems 
can be coaxed into cooperation if mutation rate or turnover rate can be manipulated (as 
is shown in Fig. 4).  
Evolution can be viewed as a process in which organisms increase their fit to the 
world by acquiring information about their environment [36,50]. Via this process, 
genomes become correlated to their environment, that is, genotypes that are adapted to 
their niche covary with the niche’s character. Clearly, such a covariance is greatly 
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enhanced if organisms can sense their environment, and thus base their decisions 
appropriately on the context. Therefore, we can expect that the evolution of sensory 
circuits that inform decisions should ultimately lead to a sufficient amount of covariance 
so that cooperation is expected according to Queller’s rule [44] (unless environments 
are so inherently uncertain that they must remain uninformative to any player). If this is 
indeed true, then it appears that cooperation does not need to be added as a “third 
fundamental principle of evolution beside mutation and natural selection” as was 
suggested before [9], because it is a consequence of evolution.  
Methods 
Population dynamics. The payoff for different moves was kept constant at Axelrod’s 
values for all simulations: 
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At each update, every player on the 32x32 grid (with wrapping boundary conditions) 
plays each of its neighbors exactly once. Upon birth, each player begins by consulting 
its PC gene for each opponent, and one of the four conditional genes thereafter, 
depending on its own play and the opponent’s response. Players are selected for 
removal randomly with a probability given by the replacement rate r, giving rise to 
overlapping generations (asynchronous updating) [51,52]. As long as the player and its 
opponent are not replaced, they continue to consult their conditional genes to make 
decisions, so the replacement rate determines the average length of play history between 
two players (if a player’s partner is replaced, the partner is greeted by consulting the 
unconditional gene). For most replacement rates, the first gene is consulted so rarely 
that it drifts neutrally, with a mean around 0.5 and a variance of 1/12, as expected for a 
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uniformly distributed random variable bounded by zero and one. As a consequence, we 
often do not show any statistics for this gene. 
To implement well-mixed populations using our grid structure, we only changed the 
identity of the pool used for replacing individuals marked for death, thus keeping the 
rest of the dynamics consistent. For structured populations, the eight neighbors of the 
marked individual are candidates for replication, with a probability proportional to their 
fitness given by their lifetime accumulated score. For well-mixed populations, the pool 
is given by all 1,023 remaining strategies in the population (in a Moran process, it is not 
usual for the individual to be marked for death to be included in the candidates for 
replication), but each strategy still plays eight neighbors. The player to be replaced, on 
the other hand, is chosen randomly among all 1,024 players in the population, 
irrespective of population structure or fitness. After replication, a genotype is mutated 
with a probability µ, which is the mean number of mutations per gene per individual, 
implemented as a Poisson process. For most of the results in this study, the gene’s 
probabilities are coarse-grained to 15 bits, which means that the probabilities are chosen 
from among 215=32,768 possible values, representing the number of possible alleles at 
that locus. This resolution affects the critical mutation rates as shown in Fig. 5B, but 
increasing the resolution past 15 bits does not (data not shown). Because the mutation 
probabilities are thought to represent the decision of entire pathways of perhaps 
hundreds of genes, they should not be compared to per-nucleotide mutation rates.  
Line of descent and consensus genotypes. Rather than collecting population averages 
of plays, we instead study the evolution of strategies by following the line of descent 
(LOD) of player genotypes for each replicate run. The LOD is obtained by choosing a 
random player at the end of the run and following its direct ancestors backwards to the 
first genotype [36]. Fig. S2A shows a typical sequence of genotypes, while Fig. S2B 
shows the play statistics for the same LOD. The population average of play statistics for 
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the same experiment is shown for comparison in figure S2C. Average lines of descent 
and average play statistics along the line of descent can be created by averaging, for 
each update, the probabilities of the genotypes as well as the probabilities of play, of the 
organism on the LOD of each of the 80 replicates at that update. Fig. S1A shows such 
an average genetic LOD, while figs. S1B and C show the average play statistic on the 
line of descent for two different mutation rates.  The latter two figures show that the 
average play statistics converge towards evolutionary fixed points that we term the 
consensus genotype, but that the time to achieve this fixed point depends on the 
mutation rate. The consensus genotype for each set of replicates is obtained by 
averaging the second half of the average genetic LOD minus the last 50,000 updates, 
which removes most or all of the transient and also the variance due to picking random 
genotypes as the originators of the LOD. Indeed, because the LOD splits at the most 
recent common ancestor (MRCA) of the population at the end of the run, the LOD past 
the MRCA is not necessarily representative of the evolutionary dynamics (as seen for 
example in Fig. S1B.) Discarding the last 50,000 updates truncates the LOD to 
genotypes before the MRCA for almost all runs. Using the MRCA genotype instead of 
the consensus genotype as representative of the fixed point does not change the results. 
Principal Component Analysis. We create the evolutionary trajectories in Fig. 1 and 
Fig. S3 by performing a principal component analysis of the set of probabilities (PCC, 
PCD, PDC, PDD) from all of the 500,000 data points on the average genetic LOD of the 80 
replicates at mutation rate µ=0.5% and replacement rate r=1%, for both the spatially-
structured and the well-mixed population, respectively. Because the first gene (PC) is 
consulted so rarely it drifts almost neutrally and is for that reason omitted from the 
PCA. Including it does not significantly affect the four other principal components (data 
not shown). For the spatially structured population we obtain PC1=(-0.86, 0.192, -0.055, 
-0.47) and PC2=(-0.348, 0.442, -0.065, 0.824). These components explain 83% and 10% 
of the variance respectively. For the well-mixed population, the principal components 
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are PC1=(-0.714, 0.132, -0.162, -0.668) and PC2=(-0.393, 0.54, 0.646, 0.37), explaining 
86% and 7% of the variance, respectively. To depict the evolutionary trajectories at 
higher mutation rate (panels B and C in Fig. 1 and panels B-D in Fig. S3), we keep the 
principal components obtained with the low mutation rate strategies so that the 
landmarks given by the common deterministic strategies such as TFT (Tit-for-Tat), 
WSLS (Win-Stay-Lose-Shift), ALL-C, and ALL-D remain at the same positions. These 
fixed components are also used to plot the location of the consensus genotype at 
mutation rate 0.5% (RC, the “robust cooperator”), and the consensus genotype at 
mutation rate 5% (RD, the “robust defector”). The consensus strategies RC and RD for 
spatially-structured and well-mixed populations are different, and described in the 
supplementary text below. Using the principal components implied by the average LOD 
obtained at 5% mutation rate (defecting attractor) instead does not change the nature of 
the results (data not shown).  
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Figures 
Fig. 1. Evolutionary trajectories and attractors. All trajectories start at the same 
point (START), and move towards the strategy marked by ‘END’. Several well-known 
strategies provide landmarks in strategy space: TFT: (PCC, PCD, PDC, PDD)=(1,0,1,0), 
ALLC=(1,1,1,1), ALLD=(0,0,0,0), WSLS=(1,0,0,1), GTFT=(1,0.333,1,0), 
START=(0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5). All experiments shown are run in a spatially-structured 
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environment at replacement rate r=1%. Trajectories for well-mixed populations are 
shown in Fig. S3. (A) Evolution of the average LOD for µ=0.5%. RC marks the 
consensus genotype (see Methods) of this trajectory, while RAND marks the consensus 
genotype at µ=50%, when the population drifts neutrally. This attractor is not the same 
as ‘END’ because that genotype lies past the most recent common ancestor of the 
population. (B) Trajectory for µ=2.5%, close to the critical mutation rate. (C) Trajectory 
for µ=5%. ‘RD’ marks the consensus genotype for these parameters. (D) Trajectories 
emanating from 16 deterministic strategies (at µ=0.5%) suggest that the fixed point is 
unique. Blue symbols: start, red dots: end points. Symbols: : TFT, : ALLC, : 
ALLD, : WSLS. A-D use principal components of trajectory shown in A. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Transitions in strategy space. (A) The order parameter m defined in Eq. [1] as 
a function of the mutation rate for a spatially-structured and a well-mixed population, 
obtained from play statistics averaged over 80 independent runs each (see Text S2). 
Errors are two standard errors. (B) Qualitative phase diagram as a function of µ and r 
for spatially-structured populations, where light grey indicates cooperation and black 
indicates defection. (C) Phase diagram for well-mixed populations. Both phase 
diagrams with quantitative levels of cooperation are shown in Fig. S4. 
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Fig. 3. Evolution of consensus genotypes. Mean of probabilities of the consensus 
genotype as a function of mutation rate (r=1%). Colored areas represent the variance of 
the probability distribution, and reflect the strength of selection. (PC is omitted because 
it drifts neutrally, see Methods). Vertical lines drawn at the critical mutation rate. (A) 
Spatially-structured. (B) Well-mixed.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Strategy evolution under changing mutation rates. Order parameter m as a 
function of update time for an experiment with five changes in mutation rate, starting 
with a type adapted to a high mutation rate of 5% (defection regime). We show the 
order parameter for the average LOD of 80 runs with the same regime of mutation rate 
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changes. The population reacts to a changed mutation rate quickly, and settles around 
the fixed point appropriate for that mutation rate, indicated in the figure. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Order parameter in different environments for spatially-structured 
populations. (A) Phase transition for populations playing with memories of different 
size as a function of genomic mutation rate µL, where L=5 for memory-one strategies 
(D1, blue line) and L=21 for memory-two strategies (D2, pink line). (B) Phase transition 
for environments with different resolutions of strategy space, from 15 bits per gene to 1 
bit per gene (deterministic strategies). Colors as in legend. 
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Supporting Information 
Figure S1. Average gene probabilities and play statistics. LOD gene probabilities 
(PXY) and play statistics (πXY) for a spatially-structured population, averaged over 80 
experiments (500,000 updates each), at different µ and fixed r (1%). PC and πC are 
omitted because PC drifts almost neutrally (see Methods) (A) Average gene 
probabilities recorded at µ=1%. (B) Play statistics recorded at µ=0.1%. (C) Play 
statistics recorded at µ=2%. 
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Figure S2. LOD and population genotypes and phenotypes.  Single run LOD gene 
probabilities (PXY) and play statistics (πXY), as well as population average play statistics, 
for a spatially-structured population at µ=1% and r=1%. PC and πC are omitted because 
PC drifts neutrally (see Methods). (A) LOD gene probabilities. (B) LOD play statistics. 
(C) Average population play statistics. 
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Figure S3. Evolutionary trajectories and attractors for well-mixed populations. All 
trajectories start at the same point (‘START’), and move towards the strategy marked by 
‘END’. Several well-known strategies provide landmarks in strategy space: ‘TFT’: 
(PCC, PCD, PDC, PDD)=(1,0,1,0), ‘ALLC’=(1,1,1,1), ‘ALLD’=(0,0,0,0), WSLS=(1,0,0,1), 
GTFT=(1,0.333,1,0), START=(0.5,0.5,0.5). All experiments shown are run at 
replacement rate r=1% for well-mixed populations. (A), Evolution of the average LOD 
for µ=0.5%. RC marks the consensus genotype of this trajectory (described in 
supplementary text). This attractor is not the same as ‘END’ because that genotype lies 
past the most recent common ancestor of the population. (B) Trajectory for µ=1.5%, 
close to the critical mutation rate. (C) Trajectory for µ=5%. ‘RD’ marks the consensus 
genotype for these parameters. (D) Trajectory for µ=50%. ‘RAND’ marks the consensus 
genotype for these parameters. 
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Figure S4. Quantitative phase transition diagrams as a function of µ  and r. 
Coloring is applied according to the order parameter (m) with dark red to black 
indicating defection (m < -0.2), light yellow to light orange indicating cooperation (m > 
0.2) and orange indicating a transition regime of equal cooperation and defection (0.2 ≥ 
m ≥ - 0.2). White colored areas contain no recorded data. (A) Spatially-structured, (B) 
well-mixed. 
 
Text S1. Description of consensus strategies 
At low mutation rates (<1%) and a fixed replacement rate of 1%, robust cooperation 
quickly emerges as the dominant strategy for both well-mixed and spatially-structured 
populations. Robustness is generally regarded as a measure of a system’s performance 
in the face of perturbation or uncertainty. In this context, robust cooperation describes 
three basic behaviors that allow players to play well against defective players and even 
when faced with their own strategy, described in the main text. 
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The consensus genotypes at high mutation rates (5%) and a fixed replacement rate 
of 1%, for both population types, are representative of robust defection. Robustness in 
this case is less of a mandate in a cooperative regime, since cooperation is inherently a 
more risky behavior in PD. Robust defectors have to maintain D exchanges while at the 
same time be willing to bait cooperative strategists with C plays and exploit them in the 
process. A PCC probability close to 0.5 with a bias towards defection compared to the 
PCC of RC is indicative of the unwillingness to engage in extended cooperative 
exchanges but at the same time a willingness to establish limited CC exchanges in hopes 
of future exploitation of a cooperative strategist. On the other hand, a very low PDD 
probability expresses eagerness to maintain defective play. For the well-mixed 
population, the PDD probability is much smaller than the equivalent probability in the 
spatially-structured population, which might be due to the absence of clusters under 
well-mixing giving rise to a higher degree of uncertainty experienced by players. The 
same reasoning might be applicable to the low PDC probability. Defector strategists in 
well-mixed populations are more willing to take advantage of cooperative players since 
they play against many more such players due to the absence of cooperative cluster 
shielding. 
Text S2. Experimental statistics 
For the spatially-structured phase transition experiments a total of 532 pairs of different 
mutation and replacement rate experiments were run, for a minimum of 13 and a 
maximum of 80 replicates for each pair (depending on the replacement rate), leading to 
14,576 replicates in total. For the well-mixed phase transition experiments a total of 304 
pairs of different mutation and replacement rate experiments were run, for a minimum 
of 10 and a maximum of 80 replicates each, leading to 10,080 replicates in total. For 
both population types, each experiment was run for 500,000 updates leading to 
approximately 7.3 billion updates for spatially-structured and 5 billion updates for well-
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mixed populations. All experiments were run in parallel on up to 25 dual core 2.6GHz 
(Intel® Pentium® Processor E5300) computers for an approximate total of about 8,500 
hours for the spatially-structured and 5,900 hours for well-mixed population 
experiments. Data collected from the phase transition experiments were used to generate 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 as well as figures S1, S2, S3 and S4. For Figure 4A and memory 
depth 2, 16 different mutation rates were run at 1% replacement rate (80 replicates 
each), for a total of 1,280 experiments requiring 1,280 CPU hours. For Figure 4B, bits 1 
to 5 were run for 40 replicate experiments at 15 different mutation rates (and a fixed 
replacement rate of 1%), for a total of 3,000 experiments (1,000 CPU hours). In total, 
the study required almost 29,000 individual experiments requiring a total of 1.9 CPU 
years (about 10 CPU weeks in parallel).  
Table S1. Consensus genotypes for different mutation rates and population 
structures. Mean probabilities for each gene averaged over 80 average LODs, with 
variance in brackets. SS: spatially-structured population, WM: well-mixed population, 
COOP: cooperator, DEFEC: defector.  
 PC PCC PCD PDC PDD 
SS COOP (µ =1%) 0.647 (0.088) 0.989 (0.005) 0.234 (0.035) 0.318 (0.075) 0.448 (0.054) 
SS DEFEC (µ =5%) 0.481 (0.084) 0.458 (0.091) 0.31 5(0.062) 0.243 (0.073) 0.325 (0.064) 
WM COOP (µ =1%) 0.595 (0.098) 0.893 (0.056) 0.247 (0.038) 0.247 (0.079) 0.356 (0.076) 
WM DEFEC (µ =5%) 0.442 (0.081) 0.460 (0.084) 0.325 (0.059) 0.063 (0.018) 0.053 (0.012) 
 
 
 
 
